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Abstract
We consider a nite population of agents and dene a contagion
process as the dynamics by which an action, which is initially played
by only a small subset of agents, is adopted by the entire population.
Each agent has a set of neighbors with whom he shares information
and a set of partners with whom he plays a game. These two sets may
or may not coincide. Each period, agents choose their actions based
on what they observe from their neighbors, and get some payo from
playing a game with their partners. We show that contagion of an
action that is risk dominant and ecient is obtained through partners
when agents imitate-the-best, and through neighbors when agents use
a myopic best response.
11 Introduction
A common assumption in the network literature is that a link between two
people captures both information sharing and interaction activities, where
interaction often means playing a game. Only a few studies, such as those
by Durieu and Solal [2] and Al os-Ferrer and Weidenholzer [1] consider these
two activities as distinct. The argument presented by Al os-Ferrer and Wei-
denholzer is that although interactions are predominantly local, information
sharing is often a broader activity. Hence, agents who do not play games
with each other can still gather information from one another. A conse-
quence of this assumption is that there cannot be any interaction among
strangers. However, this is not always the case in real life situations. For
example, understanding how viruses spread in a population necessitates the
acknowledgment that people do not always interact with whom they know.
In most cases, people do get contaminated because they did not know the
person they were interacting with was infected. The human sexual con-
tact network and the transmission of diseases such as herpes or HIV illus-
trates this point quite clearly. Furthermore, this is not just a matter of
distinguishing clearly between information and interaction. As it may take
several months or years for someone to learn about their condition, it is
primordial to capture the fact that interactions can happen without any
information transfer, or that this information transfer happens so long af-
ter the interaction that it becomes almost irrelevant. Hence, not only are
information sharing and interaction distinct activities, but the people with
whom one interacts may dier from those whom one acquires information.
The assumption that people only interact with those they know needs fur-
ther study. Therefore, our aim is to investigate whether such assumption
is innocuous in contagion processes when information and interaction net-
works are distinct, and potentially dierent. Specically, in this paper we
show that allowing separation between information and interaction networks
can drastically alter previous results obtained in the contagion literature.
2We are not the rst to investigate contagion processes within networks.
In his paper, Morris [6] considers an innite population of agents who are
part of an arbitrary network. A link represents both the exchange of in-
formation and the interaction that take place between two agents. Each
period, agents play a game with a nite subset of the population and choose
one of two possible actions. The game considered presents two strict Nash
equilibria. The action choice is determined by a myopic best response to
the frequency of plays in the population in the previous period. An ac-
tion is said to be contagious if it spreads to the entire population when
it is initially played by only a nite subset of agents. The main focus of
Morris' paper is to characterize, through some qualitative properties of the
network, the contagion threshold of the network, i.e. the number of agents
needed to promote the contagion of a given action. In particular, Morris
shows that an action can only spread if it is risk dominant, as dened by
Harsanyi and Selten [4]. An extension of Morris' work by L opez-Pintado [5]
provides the exact contagion thresholds of random networks using particu-
lar connectivity distributions. Other papers such as the ones by Durieu and
Solal [2] and Al os-Ferrer and Weidenholzer [1] also study similar contagion
processes within networks. Both studies consider a game which presents
two strict Nash equilibria, one of which is either risk dominant, ecient or
both. Durieu and Solal [2] consider a nite population of agents placed on
a circle and study the contagion of the risk dominant action when agents
use best response. Al os-Ferrer and Weidenholzer [1] consider arbitrary net-
works and look at the contagion of the ecient action when agents play
imitate-the-best.
Our paper builds on Morris [6] and denes a contagion process as the
dynamics by which an action, which is initially played by only a small subset
of agents in a population, is adopted by the entire population. We consider
a nite population of agents who exchange some information and interact
with one another. The game we consider is similar to those used by Durieu
3and Solal [2] and Al os-Ferrer and Weidenholzer [1] and agents use either
best response or imitate-the-best.
However, we depart from the previous literature in that we make an
explicit distinction between interaction and information. We characterize
two distinct networks using simulation methods. An information network
is dened as a network in which a link represents an exchange of informa-
tion between two agents, and an interaction network is dened as a network
in which links represent interactions among agents. Furthermore, we con-
sider both best response and imitate-the-best decision rules. The reason for
considering both rules is that one is based on frequency of plays while the
other focuses on payos. Also, our main interest diers from Morris [6] and
L opez-Pintado [5] as we do not look at contagion thresholds, but rather we
are interested in whether contagion uses either interaction or information or
both to spread. Finally, we introduce small world networks as dened by
Watts and Strogatz [8] in addition to the exponential, scale-free and homo-
geneous networks, presented by L opez-Pintado [5]. As these networks are
not characterized by a particular connectivity distribution they allow us to
understand whether our results are tied with connectivity distributions or
not.
We replicate the results of L opez-Pintado [5] when information and in-
teraction networks are the same and show that the separation of information
and interaction networks results in dierent outcomes. We show that agents'
behavior dictates which network, interaction or information, matters most
for contagion. With best response, information leads contagion while with
imitate-the-best, contagion spreads through interactions. Although theo-
retical, these results have important implications in policies. For example,
consider the spread of the H1 virus. If the population's behavior is guided
by frequencies of plays, then information campaigns may indeed be worth
the spending. On the other hand, if people are imitators, money will be
better spent on quarantine programs.
4This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the networks con-
sidered, how we generate them, the game played and the behavioral rules
used by the agents. In Section 3, we show how results vary between situa-
tions where information and interaction networks are the same in contrast
to situations in which they are distinct. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a nite population of agents N = 1;2;:::;i;:::n who engage
in interaction and information sharing activities. Each agent has a set of
neighbors, with whom he shares information and a potentially dierent set
of partners, with whom he interacts. The exchanges of information between
neighbors constitute an information network while the interactions among
partners dene an interaction network. It is possible for a neighbor to also
be a partner, and vice versa, but we are interested in situations where this
is not always the case.
Each period, agents play a 2  2 game with each of their partners and
choose one of two possible actions. Agent i's choice of action depends on the
information he gathers from his neighbors and his payo is the sum of the
payos obtained from each of his pairwise interactions. Once agents played
and obtained their payos, one agent is selected at random with positive
probability to revise his action. His payos and his partners' payos are
then updated, and the next period starts.
These dynamics dene a Markov process over the set of all possible
states, where a state is a vector that species the action played by each
agent. We are interested in understanding the inuences of information and
interactions on contagion processes, i.e. the dynamics by which the Markov
process converges to a state where all agents play the same action.
52.1 Networks
In our framework, a network, whether it is an information or an interaction
network, is an undirected graph where the vertices represent the agents and
the links capture the activities between agents.
2.1.1 Interaction vs Information
In an information network, a link represents an exchange of information
between two agents, where an agent's information has two elements: the
agent's last played action and associated payo. Hence, we represent an
information network as an undirected graph with adjacency matrix L, where
lij = 1 if there is a link between i and j and lij = 0 otherwise. For each
agent i, we dene a set of neighbors as Ni = fj 2 N s:t lij = 1 g. We do
consider that agent i is a neighbor of himself, i.e. lii = 1.
Similarly, in an interaction network, a link between two agents represents
the fact that these two agents play the game together each period. Interac-
tions are modeled using a graph with adjacency matrix M, where mij = 1
if there is a link between i and j and mij = 0 otherwise. Each agent i has
a set of partners that is dened as Pi = fj 6= i 2 N s:t mij = 1g. Note that
although we assume that agent i can observe his own action and payo, he
does not interact with himself.
As stated earlier, we look at cases where information and interaction
networks are distinct. This allows us to disentangle the eects of information
and interactions on contagion processes. We follow the literature and focus
our attention on some particular network types that we introduce in the
following section.
2.1.2 Types of Networks
Let ki be the connectivity of agent i. The connectivity of agent i is the
number of links agent i has with other agents. It is the number of agent i's
6neighbors if we consider the information network, and it is the number of
agent i's partners if we look at the interaction network. Hence,
P(k) = 1
nCard(fi 2 N with ki = kg)
represents the connectivity distribution of a given network.
In this paper, we focus our attention on four types of networks: homo-
geneous, exponential, scale-free and small-world. An homogeneous network,
or regular graph, is one where ki is exactly k for all i. An exponential net-
work presents a connectivity distribution that peaks at an average < k >
and decays exponentially for large k. A scale-free network has a connectiv-
ity distribution PSF(k)  k  with  usually between 2 and 3. This allows
some nodes to have very high connectivity.
Finally, small-world networks of Watts and Strogatz [8] are not charac-
terized by their connectivity distribution but rather by their overall path-
length and their clustering coecient. The overall path length is the average
number of hops between one node and every other node. The clustering co-
ecient is the proportion of an agent's neighbors who are also neighbors
with one another in the information network. A similar denition applies
to the interactions network. The characteristics of small-world networks is
that they have a small average path length and a high clustering coe-
cient, compared to a Erd~ os and R eniyi (Bernouilli) random graph [3] with
the same number of nodes and equivalent average degree of connectivity.
The integration of small world networks in our study allows us to under-
stand whether our results are fundamentally linked with specic forms of
connectivity distributions.
The fact that small-world networks are not characterized by their con-
nectivity distribution implies that it is possible for example to have a small-
world network that has a scale-free distribution, or a scale-free network that
has the characteristics of a small-world. If this happens too often, there
will be no dierence in our results between scale-free networks and small-
worlds. In order to avoid this phenomenon, for each trial and each type of
7network, we picked one network among the hundred networks we generated.
It minimizes the likelihood of generating only scale-free small-worlds and
eliminates the risk of getting results for a very peculiar set of networks.
Scale-free and exponential networks were built following the algorithm
proposed by Newman et al. [7]. Log-likelihood tests of the resultant power-
law degree distribution generated  as given, and L =  11:5 (xmin = 4).
The exponential distribution was tested with a standard transformed OLS
procedure with  as given, t statistic 30.9 and R2 = 0:98. Homogeneous
and small-world graphs were built following the local wiring approach as in
Watts and Strogatz [8]. A rewiring probability of 1 was used to produce
each small-world network. Figure 1 illustrates the shapes of the networks
considered in this paper, while Table 1 summarizes their characteristics. All
the graphs we generate are connected, i.e. there is always a sequence of links
from one agent to any another agent. This avoids the absence of contagion
due to isolated nodes in either networks. Furthermore, we compare graphs
with similar average degrees to avoid unwanted network eects.
a b
c d
Figure 1: Example networks studied in this paper: a) Scale-free; b) Expo-
nential; c) Homogeneous; and d) Small-world.
8Table 1: Properties of graphs presented in this paper.
Scale-free Exponential Homogeneous Small-world
P(k) k  e k= - -
 2.7 8.3 - -
hki 7.6 7.9 8.0 8.0
2.2 Dynamics of the Game
Each period, each agent interacts with each of his partners and chooses an
action from the space S = f0;1g. Payos from each pairwise interaction are





where d > f and b > e so that the game is a coordination game with two
strict Nash Equilibrium (0;0) and (1;1).
Let q = b e
d f+b e be the probability associated with playing 1 in the
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. If q  1=2, then action 1 is said to be risk
dominant as dened by Harsanyi and Selten [4]. The lower the value of q,
the more risk dominant action 1 is. Player i's total payo i at the end of
the period is the sum of his pairwise interactions' payos:
i = j2Pi(si;sj)
where (si;sj) can be read in the above matrix and si, sj 2 S = f0;1g.
2.3 Behavioral Rules
We assume that agents use either one of two common decision rules: myopic
best response and imitate-the-best. The choice of these rules is motivated
9by the fundamental dierences that exist between them. The myopic best
response focuses on frequency of plays while imitate-the-best focuses on
payos. Hence, best-response gives more importance to information than
interactions, as what matters for an agent's decision is the frequency of
plays within his neighborhood, and hence, whoever interacts with whom is
irrelevant. For imitate-the-best, interactions do matter as they determine
the payos, but the decision regarding which action to play is still made
through the observation of the payos. Hence, with imitate-the-best, it is
not clear which is matters most: information or interactions.
Furthermore, we do not consider any mixing of the two rules within
the population, i.e. for any given experiment, all agents follow the same
rule. This allows us to highlight why, when a decision rule is based rather
on frequency of actions than payos (and vice versa), it is primordial to
correctly specify and separate the information network from the interaction
network.
We study the contagion of action 1, the risk dominant action, as conta-
gion of action 0 cannot occur with best response as demonstrated by Morris
[6]. Hence, the starting state contains only a very small fraction of agents
playing 1. When agents use the imitate-the-best rule, we had to increase the
proportion of agents playing 1 at the start of the game in order to obtain
contagion. This does not aect our results in any way, as we will explain
later.
For myopic best response, we assume that all agents react to the dis-
tribution of plays within their neighborhood. In our case, it means that
player i chooses 1 if he observes that the proportion of his neighbors playing
1, excluding himself, is higher than q. The reason why we exclude agent i
from the sample is because when using best response, player i samples from
others to see what he will likely encounter. He then makes his response to
the rest of the world appropriately. Since his own play is being changed
subject to others, it is non-sensical for him to include himself.
10If agent i plays using the imitate-the-best rule, he chooses the action
that gave him or his neighbors the highest payo in the previous period.
In this case, we assume that player i includes his own past experience in
his decision. He samples from his neighbors because he considers that what
they have experienced (i.e. their payos) could be a good proxy for what
he is likely to experience. If his neighbors experienced a higher payo than
himself, then he rightly tries out their strategy.
3 Results
Each trial, we choose one network from a set of 100 networks in the database
(for a given network type) we generated. We then identify the probability of
full contagion for each type of network structures and each combination of
network structures. The results presented below were obtained with a game
where d = 5, b = 1, e = f = 0, and hence, q = 1
6 and the outcome of the
strategy prole (1;1) is risk dominant and ecient. Results are similar for
dierent games, as long as q < 1
2 and the equilibrium is risk dominant and
ecient.1
When the game considered presents a risk dominant equilibrium which
is not ecient, the results are identical for best response, but dier with
imitate-the-best. This is due to the fact that imitation favors the ecient
strategy (strategy 0), and hence, contagion of action 1 is unlikely to occur
when the risk dominant action is not ecient.
We initialize the percentage of agents playing action 1 at the start of
the simulations at 1% when best response is used. With imitate-the-best,
we move to initialization with 5%. The reason for the change in initial
conditions is explained by the fact that with imitation, the contagion process
is harder to start. Since we are comparing networks to one another, keeping
the decision rule and starting conditions constant, this does not compromise
1Simulations results for games with dierent parameter values are available from the
authors upon request.
11our results in any way.
3.1 Identical Networks
Fig. 3.1 reports the probability of full contagion, when interaction and in-
formation networks are identical, showing data convergence under best re-
sponse with number of trials for the four dierent networks: Scale-free (),
Exponential (4), Homogeneous () and Small-world (+). After 500 trials,
the signal from the simulation had settled down suciently to begin com-
paring experiments. To be sure, all simulations to follow were run for 1000
trials with subsequent statistical test conducted on this larger number of
repeats.
Figure 2: Probability of full contagion for each type of networks, 1000 trials.
When information and interaction networks are identical, the percentage
of networks for which full contagion is obtained depends on the network type,
12as shown in Table 2. Recall that the relative values between best response
and imitate-the-best do not matter as initial conditions dier.
Table 2: Percentage of full contagion when identical networks
Scale-free Exponential Homogeneous Small-world
Best response 18.9 14.8 2.7 4.3
Imitate-the-Best 33.6 23.2 13.2 13.2
The comparison of proportions by p-values for fraction of trials ending
in full contagion when information and interaction networks are identical
are presented in Table 3. The test we used was built as follows. Given
the hypothesis for two proportions p1 = p2 with equal sample size n, the
relevant test-statistic reduces to:
z =
(^ p1 ^ p2) p
2^ p(1 ^ p)=n,
where ^ p = (x1+x2)=(2n) for count x1 and x2 of successes in each sample
of size n respectively. Underline indicates p  2:5% (i.e. siginicance at 5%
level (two-tailed)), boldface indicates p  0:5% (i.e. sig. at 1% level (two-
tailed)). This convention is used for all subsequent Tables unless otherwise
stated. Therefore, a bold underline number means that the percentage of
trials ending in full contagion for the two considered networks is statistically
dierent at a level of 1%. If the number is only underline, the dierence is
statistically accepted at 5%.
13Table 3: Comparison of proportions by p-values for fraction
of trials ending in full contagion
Exponential Homogeneous Small-World
Scale-Free 0:016 0:000 0:000
Best Exponential 0:000 0:000
Response Homogeneous 0.974
Scale-Free 0:000 0:000 0:000
Imitate-the Exponential 0:000 0:000
-best Homogeneous 0.5
Notes:
Underline indicates p  2:5% (i.e. siginicance at 5% level (two-tailed)), boldface
indicates p  0:5% (i.e. sig. at 1% level (two-tailed))
These results show that, with either decision rule, dierent networks
lead to dierent success rates of contagion, with the exception of small-
world and homogeneous graphs. Hence, when both networks are identical,
successful contagion mainly depends on the network structures considered.
The similarity of small-world and homogeneous can be explained by the fact
that homogeneous networks are used to generate small-worlds. Therefore,
small-worlds may still present very similar characteristics to homogeneous
networks thus explaining why the p-value is not signicant. These results
constitute the benchmark of our study.
3.2 Distinct Networks
For each type of networks, the proportions of networks for which full con-
tagion arises, with either best response or imitate-the-best, are reported in
Table 4. The lines represent the interaction networks whereas the columns
14represent the information networks. Hence, the rst line shows the per-
centage of full contagion for a scale-free interaction network, under best
response, when the information network is scale-free, exponential, homoge-
neous or small-world. The rst column shows the percentage of full con-
tagion for a scale-free information network, when the interaction network
is scale-free, exponential, homogeneous or small-world, under best response
rst, and then under imitate-the-best.
Table 4: Percentage of full contagion when distinct networks
INF Scale-free Exp. Homog. Small-world
Scale-free 19.4 13.5 4.2 5.0
Best I Exponential 18.7 4.8 3.3 5.2
Response N Homogeneous 19.8 5.2 3.5 3.7
T Small-world 19.0 4.1 4.4 3.8
Scale-free 15.3 18.5 18.3 15.3
Imitate-the I Exponential 17.0 14.5 13.7 13.0
-best N Homogeneous 7.6 7.0 12.2 13.3
T Small-world 8.6 9.6 13.8 10.9
In order to isolate the eects of information, we consider simulations
for which the interaction network is invariant. The results presented below
in Table 5 are for a scale-free interaction network, but similar results are
obtained with other types of interaction network.
15Table 5: Comparison of proportions by p-values for fraction
of trials ending in full contagion with invariant scale-free in-
teraction network
Inv. Interaction Information Network
Net: SF Exponential Homogeneous Small-World
Information Scale-Free 0:015 0:000 0:000
Network Exponential 0:000 0:000
(Best response) Homogeneous 0.803
Information Scale-Free 0.2243 0.964 0.500
Network Exponential 0:995 0.776
(Imitate-the-best) Homogeneous 0.036
Notes:
Underline indicates p  2:5% (i.e. siginicance at 5% level (two-tailed)), boldface
indicates p  0:5% (i.e. sig. at 1% level (two-tailed))
With an invariant interaction network, the results depend on the decision
rule considered. For best-response, the results we obtained are similar to
our benchmark. This means that the isolation of the interaction network did
not matter, and that the proportions of full contagion vary with the type of
the information network. This suggests that with best-response, contagion
occurs through the information network.
With imitate-the-best, these results dier considerably from our bench-
mark. When the interaction network is invariant, the proportion of trials
ending in full contagion is similar for most information networks. Hence,
the information network does not play a role in the contagion process. This
means that when agents imitate-the-best, full contagion of action 1 is ob-
tained through interactions.
In order to conrm our rst results, we now consider a set of simulations
16where the information network is invariant.Results are presented in Table 6.
Table 6: Comparison of proportions by p-values for fraction
of trials ending in full contagion with invariant scale-free in-
formation network
Inv. Information Interaction Network
Net: SF Exponential Homogeneous Small-World
Interaction Scale-Free 0.589 0.589 0.410
Network Exponential 0.500 0.326
(Best response) Homogeneous 0.326
Interaction Scale-Free 0.887 0:000 0:000
Network Exponential 0:000 0:000
(Imitate-the-best) Homogeneous 0.794
Notes:
Underline indicates p  2:5% (i.e. siginicance at 5% level (two-tailed)), boldface
indicates p  0:5% (i.e. sig. at 1% level (two-tailed))
In the case where the information network is invariant, we observe that
results are similar to our benchmark with imitate-the-best, but strongly
dier with best response. With imitate-the-best, isolating the information
network has no impact on the proportions of processes ending in full con-
tagion. This conrms the observations made above, that is contagion arises
through interactions when agents imitate-the-best. On the other hand, with
best response, the results show that there is no dierence between the inter-
action networks. Hence with best response, contagion spreads through the
information network.
174 Conclusions
These results provide valuable insights as to which networks matters most
for a given behavioral rule. They also highlight the intricate dependence
between behavioral rules and networks. If agents focus on the frequency
of plays, contagion happens through the information network, while if they
make their decision based on payos levels, contagion spreads through in-
teractions.
These results are important as they underline why, by loosely dening
links between agents, results may be inaccurate. Coming back to our initial
example regarding the spread of viruses or sexually transmitted diseases, our
results show that it is crucial to understand whether the population behave
according to frequencies of plays or outcomes levels. This does present some
signicant implications for policies. If people rely on frequencies of plays,
informing them is worth the investment as it will shape their decision on
whether to protect themselves. On the other hand, if people are imitators,
information has minimal impact on the contagion process, and intervention
on interactions is needed to avoid the contagion of risky behaviors. Other
instances for which our results could have implications are the human sexual
contact network, the Internet and eBay auctions.
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